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 THE COURT’S EXERCISE OF 
PLENARY POWER:  
REWRITING THE TWO-ROW 
WAMPUM 
Gordon Christie* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Mitchell v. M.N.R.1 stands as an illustration of so much of what is wrong in 
contemporary jurisprudence on Aboriginal rights. In Binnie J.’s concurring 
judgment we may also be witness to a preview of the Court’s approach to 
claims of Aboriginal rights to self-determination. If so, it signals an approach 
which will, if anything, amplify what is wrong in contemporary jurisprudence 
on Aboriginal rights. Unfortunately, should Binnie J.’s approach be rejected, 
the default position — the standard approach to Aboriginal rights developed in 
R. v. Van der Peet2 — may simply be extended to questions of Aboriginal self-
determination, a situation which does not promise to Aboriginal people any 
greater measure of control over their lives and territories.  
In the first section of this work the major findings of the majority decision in 
Mitchell will be quickly examined, effort being made to highlight how their 
treatment of the claimed right exhibits so many of the faults of the domestic 
treatment of Aboriginal law. This allows for a more leisurely examination of 
the more interesting developments in Mitchell, most of which are explicitly 
found in Binnie  
J.’s decision. Since the problematic approach to Aboriginal rights exemplified 
in Mitchell is now firmly entrenched in Canadian  
jurisprudence, energies are best spent on getting a clear picture of where the 
Court has indicated in Mitchell it may be on the brink of taking the law (and so, 
Canada). 
While the full Court has yet to choose the path suggested by Binnie J., on a 
fundamental level whether it does or not may be irrelevant, for a history of 
settled decisions acts as a control on alternatives the Court will consider. It will 
not be surprising if the Court decides to take the path Binnie J. suggests, though 
as a radical extension and amplification of troubling doctrine it would neverthe-
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less be serious and disturbing. If, on the other hand, the Court rejects this ap-
proach in favour of adopting what it will undoubtedly trumpet as a “liberal and 
generous” alternative, it will most certainly fall in line with the disturbing road 
well-travelled, that road illustrated by what is so wrong with its treatment of 
Aboriginal rights in Mitchell. This study ends, then, with something of an 
archaeological investigation, a dig into the ruins of Aboriginal law, to make 
sense of the doctrine of sovereign incompatibility, to come to some sense of 
how the field of Aboriginal law has come to trap Aboriginal peoples. The paper 
closes with suggestions about how this excavation might lead to the resurrec-
tion of Aboriginal rights from the ruins of Aboriginal law. 
II.  THE GENERAL APPROACH TO ABORIGINAL RIGHTS, AND 
OBVIOUS PROBLEMS 
Chief Justice McLachlin, writing for the majority, applied to the claimed 
right the now firmly entrenched approach to Aboriginal rights, as set out in Van 
der Peet.3 This is a purposive approach, applied to existing Aboriginal and 
treaty rights recognized and affirmed in section 35 of the Constitution Act, 
1982.4 The purpose of this constitutional provision has been determined to be to 
protect Aboriginal rights so as to effect a reconciliation between (a) the  
presence of organized Aboriginal societies prior to the arrival of Europeans, 
and (b) Crown sovereignty. This reconciliation mandates that the law protect 
those practices, traditions and customs that are “Aboriginal” in nature — that 
is, those which are integral to the distinctive culture of the people claiming the 
right.  
The party claiming the right must demonstrate to the court, then, that it en-
gaged in the tradition, practice or custom at the time of contact with Europeans, 
that this activity was central to their collectivity, that the right is one aspect of 
the party’s culture that “made [the party] what [it was],” and that the activity 
engaged in today — the subject of the legal dispute — is a modern form of that 
activity, one not unduly tainted by European influence (so it can still properly 
be thought of as “Aboriginal”). 
As one concern to be addressed within the Van der Peet test, a court has to 
consider how to properly frame the claimed right. In R. v. Sparrow5 the Su-
preme Court dealt with the issue of how to properly frame a claim in the con-
                                                                                                                                                              
3
 Ibid. 
4
 Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 
[hereinafter Constitution Act, 1982].  Section 35 (1) states that: “The existing [A]boriginal and 
Treaty Rights of the [A]boriginal Peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.” 
5
 R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 [hereinafter Sparrow] 
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text of unpacking the meaning of the word “existing” in section 35. So as to 
avoid having the unpalatable result of a “patchwork” of rights across Canada, 
each partially defined in relation to regulations tied to the various jurisdictions 
within which Aboriginal peoples live, the Court chose to avoid defining rights 
in relation to government action.6  
In her dissent in Van der Peet, McLachlin J. (as she then was) argued for a 
clear distinction between a right and its exercise, stating that the definition of 
the right must be cast in general terms, and allowing that the exercise of the 
right may “take many forms and vary from place to place and from time to 
time.”7 In a similar vein, L’Heureux-Dubé J., in her dissent in Van der Peet, 
asked that Aboriginal rights be “contemplated on a multi-layered or multi-
faceted basis”, avoiding the practice of simply “focusing on a particular prac-
tice, tradition or custom.”8 As L’Heureux-Dubé J. went on to note by analogy, 
section 2(b) of the Charter is not understood to merely protect “political speech, 
commercial expression or picketing, but involves rather the protection of the 
ability to express”.9 
Chief Justice Lamer, speaking for the majority in Van der Peet, ignored the 
arguments of McLachlin and L’Heureux-Dubé JJ., seemed to turn away from 
the discussion in Sparrow, and chose another path. Rather than avoid definition 
in relation to government action, rather than framing the right in general terms, 
rather than ensuring that the right be framed as a “right” and not an activity, the 
majority decided that in defining an Aboriginal right a court is to “consider 
such factors as the nature of the action which the applicant is claiming was 
done pursuant to an [A]boriginal right, the nature of the governmental regula-
tion, statute or action being impugned, and the practice, custom or tradition 
being relied upon to establish the right.”10 
Given this understanding of how Aboriginal claims would be characterized 
as “rights”, the Mohawk interests in the Mitchell case were certain to be mis-
cast. The interests would not be expressed as general abilities to do certain sorts 
of things, but as the particular things themselves — they would be called 
“rights” when they were more on the order of activities, the sorts of things that 
would normally be considered to be things protected under rights.  
As the Court deployed the three factors which go into “properly” characteriz-
ing the right, it determined that the right was properly cast as one of moving 
across the St. Lawrence River/border for the purpose of trading. It could not be 
                                                                                                                                                              
6
 Ibid., at 1091–93. 
7
 Van der Peet, supra, note 2, at para. 238. 
8
 Ibid., at para. 156. 
9
 Van der Peet, supra, note 2, at para. 158 (emphasis added). 
10
 Ibid., at para. 53. 
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simply a right to trade, for that would fail to bring in the “nature of the govern-
mental regulation, statute or action being impugned”.11 It had to be, then, a right 
to cross the river, for that characterization engaged the border restrictions. 
However, it could not be simply a right to move freely across the border, for the 
Mohawk in this case wished to trade with their northern neighbours. Finally, it 
could not be simply a right to avoid having to pay customs duties on the goods 
they wished to transport, for that would too narrowly focus on the government 
action, which is essentially an incident to the government’s underlying action, 
that of controlling the border. 
With its characterization in hand — the product of egregious principles de-
termining the process of characterization — the Court turned to the manner by 
which the trial court both admitted evidence and gave it weight. Over both 
these govern rules of evidence, “applied purposively to promote truth-finding 
and fairness”,12 but applied flexibly in the context of Aboriginal claims, “in a 
manner commensurate with the inherent difficulties posed by such claims and 
the promise of reconciliation embodied in section 35(1).”13  
The Court found no fault with the trial judge’s findings concerning which 
evidence to admit, but had serious concerns over the weight he seemed to then 
give to this evidence. Acknowledging that “a consciousness of the special 
nature of [A]boriginal claims is critical to the meaningful protection of section 
35(1) rights”,14 the Court found it “imperative that the laws of evidence operate 
to ensure that the [A]boriginal perspective is ‘given due weight by the 
courts’”.15 But giving due weight is not the same thing as putting that evidence 
automatically in the category of “persuasive”. Courts must continue to operate 
under general evidentiary principles, a process which (apparently) is synony-
mous with the application of principles of “common sense”.16 
Under this understanding of how to weigh admitted evidence, the Court 
found that while there was evidence that trading was a central and distinguish-
ing feature of traditional Mohawk culture, there was insufficient evidence to 
find that this trading was established along a north-south axis, across the St. 
Lawrence River.  
This was sufficient to decide the case, as the Mohawk had not shown that 
moving across the St. Lawrence to trade was an activity in which they had 
traditionally engaged. The Court went on to note, however, that the Mohawk 
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 Ibid., at para. 53. 
12
 Mitchell, supra, note 1, at para. 30. 
13
 Ibid., at para. 29. 
14
 Ibid., at para. 37. 
15
 Ibid., at para. 37, quoting from Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 
[hereinafter Delgamuukw]. 
16
 Mitchell, supra, note 1, at para. 38. 
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had also failed to establish that this particular activity was integral to their 
distinctive culture. Furthermore, since the right had not been established, the 
issue of infringement did not have to be addressed. One can only imagine how 
this might have been argued had an Aboriginal right been found. 
III.  THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MITCHELL: THE IMPACT OF CROWN 
SOVEREIGNTY 
The majority felt that by carefully characterizing the claimed right, by prop-
erly weighing the admitted evidence, and by applying the test for Aboriginal 
rights, the claim of the Mohawk was found not to be protected by section 35. 
With this result, it was not felt to be appropriate to comment on an innovative 
argument raised by the Crown, that the claimed right was incompatible with the 
sovereignty of the Crown.17 If the right were incompatible with the sovereignty 
of the Crown, so the argument went, it would not have been capable of surviv-
ing sovereign succession.  
Nevertheless, in deciding not to consider this argument, McLachlin C.J. went 
on to suggest that when the appropriate occasion arose, the argument might run 
into some judicial reluctance: 
In the Van der Peet trilogy, this Court identified the [A]boriginal rights protected 
under section 35(1) as those practices, customs and traditions integral to the distinc-
tive cultures of [A]boriginal societies. ... Subsequent cases affirmed this approach 
... and have affirmed the doctrines of extinguishment, infringement and justification 
as the appropriate framework for resolving conflicts between [A]boriginal rights 
and competing claims, including claims based on Crown sovereignty.18  
Concurring in the result, Binnie J. (speaking also for Major J.) felt it neces-
sary to make some comments on the issue of sovereign incompatibility. In 
particular Binnie J. felt that the agreed-upon result should be the outcome of 
application of this doctrine, as this case highlighted the sort of claimed right 
which could not survive sovereign succession. It would be a mistake in his 
mind, then, to simply go ahead and apply the Van der Peet test, as the claimed 
right would not actually arise as a candidate for consideration under section 
35(1).  
Central to Binnie J.’s musings about the nature of this doctrine is his claim 
that the general nature of section 35 rights must be understood in the context of 
both the history around sovereign succession and the history around section 35 
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 In the context of rights potentially falling under s. 35 this is an innovative argument, but a 
form of this argument has undergirded the position of the Crown for quite some time. 
18
 Mitchell, supra, note 1, at para. 63. 
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itself. The events comprising sovereign succession took place in an historical 
context, when the common law (through principles structuring the legal nature 
of this succession) held that the laws and customs of local people brought under 
the sovereignty of the Imperial Crown would be respected (the element of 
continuity), subject to their being compatible with the “conscience” of the 
common law and the sovereignty of the Crown (the doctrine of sovereign in-
compatibility).19  
Similarly, the emergence of section 35 must be placed in its own historical 
context, one marked by the decision on the part of the “elected representatives 
of Canadians”20 to recognize and affirm the existing rights of the Aboriginal 
peoples of Canada.  
As the latter history highlights the political origins of section 35 and the 
rights it protects, the rights can be said to be based in Mohawk society; but 
ultimately, if the asserted claim “is to prevail, it does so not because of its own 
inherent strength, but because the Constitution Act, 1982 brings about that 
result.”21 According to  
Binnie J., linking these two histories together is the understanding of the politi-
cal framers of the Constitution Act, 1982, for they would “undoubtedly” have 
had in mind the common law’s approach to sovereign succession.22 Bolstering 
this argument about the intent of the framers is the notion that there is nothing 
to suggest that section 35 signals a wholesale repudiation of the common law 
approach to Aboriginal rights, especially as regards their vulnerability to sover-
eign incompatibility. In Binnie J.’s colourful phrase, “[t]he Constitution Act, 
1982 ushered in a new chapter but it did not start a new book.”23 
The common law approach to sovereign succession is expounded upon in 
Campbell v. Hall and Calder v. British Columbia (Attorney General).24 The 
Imperial court in Campbell held that in situations of conquest certain principles 
govern the transition from the legal regime in place before conquest to the 
establishment of Crown sovereignty. The local laws and customs in place 
before the assertion of sovereignty are presumed to continue to exist, subject to 
                                                                                                                                                              
19
 That laws and customs deemed “unconscionable” would not survive sovereign succession 
would seem more likely to be a principle derived from the law of equity, but having a long pedi-
gree, it actually reflects (as Mansfield C.J. notes in Campbell v. Hall (1774) 1 Cowp. 204, 98 E.R. 
1045 [hereinafter Campbell]) Christian sensibilities. Justice Binnie notes (at para. 141) that Black-
stone (in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, 4th ed., (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1770), 
Book 1, at p. 107), gives the example of “infidel” laws.  
20
 Mitchell, supra, note 1, at para. 70. 
21
  Ibid., at para. 69. 
22
  Ibid., at para. 114. 
23
  Ibid., at para. 115. 
24
 Supra, note 19; Calder v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1973] S.C.R. 313 [here-
inafter Calder]. 
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the exceptions noted earlier, until the new sovereign acts to alter, eliminate or 
replace. In Calder the Supreme Court took note of these principles, and applied 
them to the common law situation in Canada, not one marked by conquest, but 
nevertheless found to be appropriately subject to this approach.25  
It is this common law understanding of the principles governing sovereign 
succession that Binnie J. would have the Court apply to the perceived need to 
understand the standing of rights claimed under section 35. Those which would 
not have been presumed to continue past the point of the assertion of Crown 
sovereignty — that is, as running contrary to the mere existence of the new 
sovereign — are not rights which ever had any existence within the domestic 
legal system, and so could not be now considered as candidates for considera-
tion under section 35.  
Would it be appropriate to label this a form of extinguishment? There would 
seem to be no conceptual barrier, so long as one is careful to appreciate the 
nature of the “extinguishing” taking place. In particular, one must appreciate 
that the common requirement that the Crown exhibit clear and plain intent to 
effect the extinguishment of Aboriginal rights does not apply in this context.26 
It only makes sense to impose this requirement in relation to exercises of 
Crown sovereignty, so this requirement would apply to those rights which 
survived the initial transition to Crown sovereignty. Rights which did not sur-
vive may have had some form of existence prior to the assertion of Crown 
sovereignty (grounded as they would have been in the earlier legal regime of 
local laws and customs), but this existence did not continue past the point of 
sovereign succession. This failure to survive past that point most naturally 
would not be seen as the result of some Crown action, but as the result simply 
of the Crown “coming to be” sovereign in this new region. In a sense there 
would be no “right” to be extinguished — one might think of this as extin-
guishment before birth. 
It should be borne in mind that this entire approach — as we noted above — 
may run into future objections from the full Court, when it finally feels it must 
turn its mind to this sort of situation. The Court may not agree with the notion 
that the common law can be used to make sense of section 35, and may instead 
decide that section 35 has its own logic, one articulated in Sparrow, Van der 
Peet, Gladstone27 and Delgamuukw. This logic, as regards sovereign incom-
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 Justice Hall noted in Calder, supra, note 24,  that “a fortiori the same principles ... must 
apply to lands which become subject to British sovereignty by discovery or by declaration”.  Why 
these principles would apply with even better reason in these contexts is not entirely clear. 
26
 See Calder, supra, note 24. This principle was firmly entrenched in domestic law in Spar-
row, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075. 
27
 R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723. 
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patibility, would rather that the question come up under either extinguishment 
or infringement.  
If considered under “garden-variety” extinguishment, the argument would 
have to be made that the federal government exhibited a clear and plain intent 
to extinguish the rights in question prior to 1982. Given the concern voiced 
above, that the requirement of clear and plain intent seems out of place in the 
context of the mere movement from the point in time before the assertion of 
Crown sovereignty to the point after, an attempt might be made to tie down the 
extinguishment in question to particular acts which accompany or flow from 
the transition. In a case such as Mitchell, for example, the potentially extin-
guishing government action might be the creation of a border.  
With rights which continued to exist past the point at which Aboriginal and 
treaty rights were “constitutionalized”, the only option for their diminishment 
would be through justified infringement.28 Since in this case the claimed right 
was not found to have been established under the Van der Peet test, the Crown 
did not have to concern itself with showing that the existence of the border 
(established as an incident to its sovereignty) was a justifiable infringement of 
the right. Clearly this option would, however, have been not only present, but 
also likely adequate to the task of justifiably restricting the movement across 
the border for the purposes of trading. 
IV.  THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MITCHELL REVISITED: THE IMPACT OF 
COURT POWER 
Is there much, then, to be concerned about with the developments in 
Mitchell? Will the doctrine of sovereign incompatibility as sketched out by 
Binnie J. take flight in Canada? If not, will the question of sovereign incom-
patibility only emerge at either the stage of extinguishment or — more likely — 
infringement?  
1. Justice Binnie Rewrites the Two-Row Wampum 
Entwined with the doctrine of sovereign succession and its application in the 
Mitchell case is the Two-row Wampum. This Wampum signifies the historic 
relation entered into between the Imperial Crown and the Mohawk, and speaks 
of a relationship of territory sharing marked by jurisdictional separation. The 
central defining feature of Binnie J.’s argument is a rewriting of the Two-row 
Wampum. From a composition which speaks of two separate vessels travelling 
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 Naturally for rights not extinguished before 1982 there would also be the possibility of 
justifiable infringement pre-1982.   
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side-by-side, each party in each vessel refraining from steering the other, Bin-
nie J. arrives at a notion of “merged sovereignty”, a vision of one vessel, com-
posed of the materials of the previous two, “pulling together as a harmonious 
whole.” This is said to be a “modern embodiment of the ‘two-row’ [W]ampum 
concept, modified to reflect some of the realities of a modern state.”29 
What legitimates this rewriting? How can a representative of the one vessel 
decide to reformulate the nature of the relationship?  
Justice Binnie’s argument is not transparent, but it emerges clearly enough 
from the many clues he scatters throughout his discussion. Justice Binnie ar-
gues that the two vessels are now one, and under the control of the Crown — 
the sovereignties having merged under the Crown — are simply a fact of his-
tory.30 Justice Binnie seems to find two supports for this vision: (a) the simple 
brute fact of the existence of the Mohawk in Canada today, and (b) their im-
plicit acceptance of that place. On occasion Binnie J. speaks of the “reality” 
which is unavoidable,31 while in other passages he suggests that the Mohawk 
have accepted their place under the control of the Crown.32  
Under Binnie J.’s approach, this vision of “reality” is tempered by an expli-
cation of what this reality encompasses: it is not said to be a simple matter of 
the Crown exerting control over the Mohawk, but of the Mohawk being part-
ners in confederation, active parties within Canadian society.33 As such there 
has been and continues to be no theft of their autonomy: historically this was 
merged within the structure of the Canadian state, and today we find ourselves 
living in a state in which this has been accomplished.  
This leads not only then to a rewriting of the Two-row Wampum, but of the 
judicially-determined purpose of section 35. While the majority in Van der Peet 
spoke of the purpose of recognizing and affirming Aboriginal rights as being 
defined by the goal of achieving a reconciliation of the prior presence of Abo-
riginal societies to Crown sovereignty, Binnie J. now introduces the notion that 
this reconciliation has already taken place.34 Under this vision, since Crown 
sovereignty already enfolds within it Mohawk autonomy, there is no need for 
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 Mitchell, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911 at para. 130 and para. 129. 
30
 Ibid., at paras. 129-30. 
31
 Ibid., at paras. 129 and 133. 
32
 Ibid., at paras. 131-32. 
33
 Ibid., at paras. 129-30, and 133. 
34
 Ibid., at paras. 129 and 164. In para. 129 Binnie J. writes:  
If the principle of “merged sovereignty” articulated by the Royal Commission on Abo-
riginal Peoples is to have any true meaning, it must include at least the idea that 
[A]boriginal and non-[A]boriginal Canadians together form a sovereign entity with a meas-
ure of common purpose and united effort.  It is this new entity, as inheritor of the historical 
attributes of sovereignty, with which existing [A]boriginal and treaty rights must be recon-
ciled. 
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the fact of Mohawk pre-existence to be worked into the fabric of Canadian 
society. Cases dealing with Aboriginal claims, then, are re-conceptualized as 
disputes about movement away from what is already in place, with the law 
acting to pull things into line with what is already both legally mandated and in 
existence. When an Aboriginal people claim a right they are in effect merely 
pressing the Crown to maintain the structure heretofore in place. 
The majority has not yet embraced this path of dealing with claims to Abo-
riginal self-determination. Undoubtedly some of the justices are well aware of 
the difficulties this invites. In situations marked by power imbalances, espe-
cially when the imbalance is created by the party now exercising control over 
the other, consent can neither be constructed nor found to be tacit or implicit. 
The history Binnie J. would have the law wash over is one of colonialism, a 
history marked by repeated efforts at subverting the original agreement con-
tained in the Two-row Wampum. The Mohawk did not ask the Canadian gov-
ernment to subvert their traditional councils in 1924. Chief Mitchell does not 
now speak of his allegiance to the Haudenosaunee as part of some sort of game.  
People of conscience cannot imagine beginning today with a “clean slate”, 
forgetting the colonial history upon which Canada now rests. People of con-
science cannot imagine that living “with a foot simultaneously in two cultural 
communities, each with its own framework of legal rights and responsibili-
ties”35 signals acceptance of this rewriting of the Two-row Wampum. Appeals 
to neither “reality” nor implicit consent will legitimize the lack of free consen-
sual relationship-building between the Mohawk and Canada.  
2. The Court Has Already Rewritten the Two-Row Wampum 
This does not mean that the majority necessarily has in mind considering an 
alternative which will promise a just and fair resolution of the problems swirl-
ing around the lack of consent in the legal and political framework currently 
structuring the Mohawk-Canadian relationship. One can read in the majority 
decision in Mitchell not just a reluctance to consider the argument about sover-
eign incompatibility, but a strategy which can appear to the observer to be both 
more insidious and potentially more dangerous than that laid out by Binnie J. 
The majority has seemingly chosen to ignore the problem of lack of consent, 
and married this aversion of the eyes to an approach to Aboriginal rights which 
the observer might suppose is meant to ensure that this problem will never need 
to draw the Court’s attention.  
The majority has chosen to approach the question of the nature of Aboriginal 
rights in such a way as to ensure that “power” or authority is never an aspect of 
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the claimed right in question. By the phrase power or authority it is not meant 
simply the ability or capacity to do some thing, if that doing must first be au-
thorized by another. Rather, it refers to the simple ability to decide to do that 
thing, coupled with the ability or capacity to do so. For example, in Sparrow 
the Musqueam were found to have the “power” (in the first sense of this term 
outlined above) to fish with overly long nets, but not the authority (in the sec-
ond sense outlined above) to decide to do so. 
Seen in this light it is clear that choosing to characterize claimed rights as 
activities not only makes it difficult for Aboriginal peoples to demonstrate the 
continued existence of rights, but also impacts on the nature of sovereign suc-
cession. With rights tied down to traditional practices or customs, and not 
traditional legal regimes authorizing those practices or customs, the nature of 
the laws and customs presumed to continue into the new regime are pre-
determined to be such as to raise few if any serious questions about the contin-
ued autonomy of Aboriginal peoples.36 
To fully appreciate how Aboriginal rights as characterized by the Court are 
unlikely to ever lead to questions about Aboriginal autonomy, we need to also 
consider the impact of the inclusion of the requirement that a claimed right be 
defined in relation to government action. It is instructive to begin by noting that 
the Court in Mitchell was faced with a number of different possible characteri-
zations of the claimed right, from a right to trade, to a right to trade with certain 
First Nations in Canada, to a right to bring goods across the border without 
paying customs, to a right to move freely across the border. Why did the Court 
apparently backtrack from Sparrow, and decide to narrow down the “properly” 
characterized right by reference to the interaction of the activity in question and 
government action? What purpose does this serve, especially given the direc-
tion in Sparrow not to do precisely this?  
We earlier took note of how Aboriginal rights are restricted to traditions, 
practices and customs, a process of characterization which makes recognition 
of Aboriginal autonomy difficult. By further characterizing the right in relation 
to government action the framework constraining Aboriginal claims draws an 
ever-tighter noose around the neck of Aboriginal self-determination, for it then 
becomes that much more conceptually difficult to frame the right in a manner 
which brings in the notion of Aboriginal authority. Government action does not 
intersect with the autonomy of parties caught up in its regulations and laws, but 
rather is directed at, once again, the activities of these parties. 
While Binnie J. is correct to note that this case is really about an attempt by 
the Mohawk to see how far their autonomy extends within the Canadian system 
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 Even Binnie J. seems well aware of this, for he notes that the doctrine of sovereign incom-
patibility will be sparingly used, as it will be sparingly required. See ibid., para. 154. 
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under section 35, this neglects to mention that the Court-defined right does not 
appear capable of containing an aspect of this autonomy. Only indirectly (and 
tenuously) is the autonomy of the Mohawk capable of being “extended” or 
protected by the sort of claim recognized by the Court.  
For example, consider how Mitchell would have played out if the evidence 
had been found to be “persuasive”. The Court would have found that the evi-
dence supported the contention that the Mohawk traded north of the St. Law-
rence, and so this activity in its modern form — that of crossing the Canadian-
U.S. border with goods to trade — would have been protected under section 35. 
But besides the obvious problem, that this activity would still be subject to 
justifiable infringement by the Crown, the larger problem looms over this 
scenario: the Mohawk would not have directly protected an Aboriginal right to 
control their trading activity. As with the Musqueam in Sparrow, they would 
have defended the right to do a certain thing, but not a right to decide to do that 
very thing. 
Clearly that is what the Mohawk wished to protect, and Chief Mitchell 
wished to argue before the Court that the Mohawk have an Aboriginal right to 
move freely across the border, a right which would have contained, ex hy-
pothesi, a degree of authority and control. The Van der Peet test, however, is 
not designed to protect such rights. What I am suggesting is that it seems de-
signed to deny such claims from getting before the Court. This provides for an 
escape from the over-arching issue — that of finding a just place in Canada for 
First Peoples neither conquered, nor discovered, nor capable of being subju-
gated by declaration. The Two-row Wampum has already been rewritten. 
Seen in this light, then, Binnie J.’s approach appears not only less insidious, 
but can also be seen to have the virtue of providing an opportunity to call the 
judiciary to task for its seizure of power. If the judiciary wishes to follow Bin-
nie J.’s lead it will open itself to questions about how it could defend such an 
approach. Will anyone reading judgments based on the notion of “merged 
sovereignty” accept that it could be a simple fact? Would not this notion of 
sovereignty, at the heart of the Canadian state seen as a liberal democracy, 
invite questions about the process which led to this purported fact? Neither 
history nor “reality” can be that process, for the first is the chronicle of coloni-
alism, the second a denial of that history. Who could avoid the conclusion that 
the process, quite simply, has yet to take place: the act of merging the sovereign 
authorities of the Crown and Aboriginal peoples is the goal, not the starting 
point. To think otherwise is to condone colonialism, to live colonialism.  
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3. A Radical Departure From Colonialism 
How then might the judiciary act if it were to forsake its current colonial 
status? The key lies in how it decides to conceive of the process of “sovereign 
succession”. With the arrival of the Crown in what is today Canada, multiple 
sovereign entities entered into a dance over single tracts of territory. Since this 
came to pass over Mohawk territory, Mohawk sovereignty has been, unques-
tionably, diminished; for two jurisdictional authorities cannot begin to co-
habitate without making some accommodations. Equally unquestionable, how-
ever, is the diminishment of Crown sovereignty. It arrived in lands already 
seized of responsibilities and obligations, with peoples organized according to 
their own visions of how the land is to be lived upon. For there to be a radical 
departure from colonialism, sovereign succession must be structured by princi-
ples which begin from this conception.  
To speak of structuring sovereign succession through principles built on a 
recognition of the need to fit two sovereign entities together over one territory 
is to twist somewhat the expression “sovereign succession”. This phrase is 
ordinarily meant to capture moments when sovereign authority passes from one 
party to another. We are imagining, for a moment, that the judiciary would dare 
to think of this expression as covering the passage from Aboriginal sovereignty 
to a truly shared and just arrangement worked out between the new arrival and 
the ancient order.  
4. Moving Away From Colonialism: A Shift in the Right  
Direction 
The Court may feel reluctant, however, to surrender power (on behalf of it-
self, and Canadian society), and may choose instead to imagine (or simply 
presume) a form of “constructive conquest” over the territories of Canada. That 
is, the Court may wish to partially follow Binnie J.’s lead, and begin to more 
openly acknowledge that it wishes to unilaterally wash over the Two-row 
Wampum in Canada. But rather than accept that the history of colonialism in 
Canada is that of the illegitimate suppression of Aboriginal sovereignty, it may 
push aside questions of illegitimacy in this context, and begin its tales with the 
premise of Crown supremacy, a premise grounded in the axiom of conquest.  
How then might it act (imagining that it would commit this original sin, but 
then want to mask it with a respectable gloss)? Bear in mind that we are sup-
posing that the Court would expand the notion of conquest, imagining that the 
Mohawk were “gradually” conquered, the growing acquisition of sovereignty 
over Canada by the Crown washing over sovereignty originally exercised by 
the Mohawk. There would still be a need, however, for this constructed con-
quest to be governed by the rule of law (as this construction takes place in a 
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constitutional liberal democracy). To see how the Court could imagine such a 
“conquest”, to see how it could do so while maintaining a vestige of Crown 
“honour”, we turn to the principles of sovereign succession advanced in Camp-
bell, and accepted in Calder. 
What creates an opportunity for the resurrection of the entire law of Aborigi-
nal rights is the tremendous amount of play contained within these bare princi-
ples. When the principles speak of the presumption that the laws and customs 
of the local peoples will remain in place until altered or removed by the Crown 
they do not specify what legal order is being presumed to continue. First, this 
could mean that the basic superstructure of the legal regime of the local peoples 
is presumed to continue, though now a sub-regime within the common law. 
This would be the meaning which best accords with the Mohawk vision of the 
Two-row Wampum, for it keeps the Mohawk vessel intact (subject of course to 
the conqueror’s power to commence dismantling this vessel, as it sees fit). 
Second, this could mean that the rights protected within the legal regimes of the 
conquered peoples are presumed to continue, though now as rights protected 
under the common law. The superstructure disappears, but what it served to 
protect continues on (again, until interfered with by the Crown). Finally, this 
could mean that activities the conquered people engaged in are presumed to be 
acceptable, until deemed not so by the Crown.  
We might term the second interpretation “compassionate colonialism”, for it 
envisions a complete transfer of power to the Crown, but with the rights of the 
indigenous peoples afforded the protection expected of rights of other subjects 
of the Crown. What we have seen so far from the Supreme Court, however, is 
not any form of compassion, for they seem to be moving toward the third sort 
of interpretation. Not only does this earn the title “ugly” colonialism, it goes 
hand-in-hand with the free play of the power of the conqueror, for the things 
protected are, strictly speaking, not rights. Again, the labours of the Court are 
extremely troubling, for not only have they indicated they may unreflectively 
move toward this vision of sovereign succession, one only sensible under the 
presumption of conquest, one which calls the Aboriginal interests it protects 
“rights” when they are really the sorts of activities which would fall under 
rights, they also take great efforts to simultaneously highlight the power of the 
Crown/conqueror to “infringe” upon these supposed rights. 
The path the Court should take, however, is clear. Bearing in mind that we 
are supposing the Court will likely want to continue to exercise its plenary 
power (and protect the plenary power of the state, with rhetoric of “constitu-
tional protection” masking this fact), the first choice at least offers some protec-
tion of the truly vital interests of Aboriginal peoples. It is the only option that 
offers any promise of a meaningful measure of Aboriginal self-determination. 
This would be especially so if coupled with a reconsideration of what the con-
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stitutionalization of Aboriginal rights ought to entail. While currently these 
“rights” continue to be subject to legislative infringement, as constitutionally 
protected rights removed from the reach of section 1 they ought to enjoy a form 
of “absolute” protection. This would be the only movement deflecting away 
from (as opposed to renouncing) Canada’s colonial history which holds out 
some promise of a truly just accommodation of Aboriginal autonomy within 
Canada, if only because it alone would hold out some promise of negotiations 
between parties essentially equal.  
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